INTRODUCTION
This article presents a case study of Tees Valley, a polycentric urban region in North East England, which has faced significant social and economic challenges over the last 30 years. The purpose of this article is to explore the potential of employing the idea of 'cultural inertia' to help explain why the area has been slow fully to recover from a period of industrial restructuring. Cultural inertia is defined as a shared mind-set (held by key stakeholders in the public, private and third sectors, by local politicians and by the population in general) which can help or hinder an area in its future development. Cultural inertia, it is argued, produces and reproduces tolerances and intolerances to change and informs people in the locality about what is possible and desirable. While cultural inertia is defined as a commonly accepted mind set about local potentiality, this does not mean that such ideas are necessarily grounded in empirical reality. Indeed, is it argued that many of the oft-quoted and taken-forgranted assumptions about what constrains progress in achieving recovery (in comparison with other areas) may actually be false.
It is not argued that once 'negative' cultural inertia has become embedded this cannot be reversed. On the contrary, there are many examples of successful former industrial core cities in northern England and elsewhere in Europe and North America whose champions have built more a confident sense of local culture and place, and reversed an apparently unstoppable cycle of decline. Instead, it concentrates on the particular problems faced by polycentric urban regions which have complex systems of governance and lack a clearly identifiable civic core which can act as a focus for transformation.
The area under scrutiny has a long distance yet to travel before it can claim to have established itself as a successful city region, but there have been signs of positive change. In early 2007 a City Region Business Case was published, based on many months of intensive strategic planning by key stakeholders across Tees Valley (Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit, 2007) . 1 The purpose of the plan was to establish a new executive body, Tees Valley Unlimited, to lead economic development by integrating the efforts of the five unitary authorities which comprise the sub-region. It is not, though, the intention of this article directly to evaluate the prospects for success with this strategy -but to explore the efficacy of cultural inertia as an explanatory variable when studying those factors which promote or constrain positive change.
The article is divided into four sections. Section one develops the conceptual ideas upon which subsequent analysis is based beginning with a critical discussion of the concept of the polycentric urban region (PUR) and its application to Tees Valley. Following this, cultural inertia is defined.
Section two details the research methods in this study. Section three outlines the key problems and challenges facing Tees Valley as defined by key stakeholders, and then explores four ways that slow development is accounted for. In so doing, the analysis demonstrates how cultural inertia limits potential for radical change. The concluding section summarises the commonly accepted explanations for social and economic retardation. I then challenge their accuracy and efficacy on the basis of the analytical work undertaken in the article.
POLYCENTRICITY AND CULTURAL INERTIA

What are polycentric urban regions?
There is much academic and policy debate in the UK at national, regional and local levels on the role of cities as economic drivers (see, for example, Core Cities Group, 2004; HM Treasury, 2006; Fothergill, 2005 (Parkinson, et al. 2006 ) identifies a number of key factors which have helped provincial cities in the UK become more socially and economically dynamic. Firstly, such cities have reversed population decline through significant inward migration. This has been led by a renewed interest in city living especially amongst younger people and has resulted in a boom in city centre housing and apartment development (see also, Champion, 2001) . Secondly, the quality of the employment offer in successful cities has improved with evidence of significant wage increases. Thirdly, cities have been the drivers of employment growth, often through discrete industrial sectoral development. Fourthly, quality of life (or liveability) in cities has been transformed by improving cultural, leisure and retailing opportunities and improving perceptions of community safety. While positive change has been identified, many northern English cities continue to suffer from significant problems of concentrated urban deprivation (Jones 2006b ).
In northern England, the success of key cities, especially
Manchester, Leeds and to a lesser extent, Sheffield, Liverpool and
Newcastle upon Tyne has generated much political excitement. But there is an awareness that smaller cities and urban conurbations have not developed at the same pace, especially so when they sit in the shadow of more successful urban areas. 2 This awareness has fuelled government interest in the promotion of integrated 'city region' strategies in less successful peripheral areas so that they may benefit from the emulation of, and closer interaction with more successful core areas. In the government's Review of Sub-National Economic Development and Regeneration (2007, see also, Fothergill, 2005) , it was stated that:
We also need to support sub-regions, including city-regions, to promote economic growth. We will work with sub-regions to allow economic development issues to be managed at this level. This will include exploring the potential for groups of local authorities to establish statutory sub-regional bodies for economic development policy areas beyond transport. (2007: 3) 3 Implicit in much of the political argument for the city region is an assumption that if the component parts of a city region share a complimentary range of key characteristics, then the 'value' of the whole region will be greater than that of its constituent parts (Parkinson et al. 2006) . The currency of debate on the benefits of defining urban conurbations as city regions is supported to some extent by a related stream of academic analysis of PURs (see Batty, 2001; Bontje, 2001; Kloosterman and Lambregts, 2001; Kloosterman and Musterd, 2001 ).
Academic interest in PURs emerged in response to a critical evaluation of the salience of studying cities as monocentric entities. Crudely put, the monocentric model assumes that city centres control the economic, social and spatial relationships in the urban periphery. Adopting monocentric models have clear drawbacks as spatial interactions within cities have become more complex; if, indeed, such models ever adequately described the structures, cultures and functions of modern cities.
The political attraction of defining proximate urban areas as PURs is explicable. As Bailey and Turok (2001) note, this appeal arises from the notion that if proximate towns and cities join forces they can become more competitive by taking advantage of (1) economies of scale, (2) industrial sectoral cooperation and integration, (3) sharing the benefits of a larger labour market, (4) pooling education, research and knowledge based services, (5) sharing business networks, (6) reduced transaction costs, (7) shared facilities such as seaports and airports, (7) knowledge sharing, and (8) exploiting complimentarity (that is, to focus on local strengths). While potential benefits can be identified, Bailey and Turok express some caution about over exaggerating such benefits.
'The process of interaction between centres leading to the reallocation of activities between them is portrayed as beneficial for the region and hence an argument in favour of PURs. In practice, the outcome is likely to be uneven with winners and losers. Some centres will lose particular types of employment and some may experience an overall decline in employment, with potentially severe impacts on particular social groups. Such impacts generate political tensions which undermine regional coherence and consensus so they cannot be ignored. ' (2001:701) It is tempting to shoe-horn areas together because they are spatially proximate, but as Musterd and van Zelm argue, it is necessary to identify an 'intensive set of social and economic interactions' not just an 'image on the map ' (2001: 680) . As Bailey and Turok (2001) show in their study of interactions between Edinburgh and Glasgow in the Central Lowlands of Scotland, for example, there appears on the surface to be some scope to define the area as a PUR, In reality, however, the cultural, economic, social and political differences between the two cities are so pronounced that the project soon falls apart.
Much of the academic debate on interactions in PURs has tended to focus on core cities or larger-scale city regions rather than or smaller cities. Such a focus is explicable. It would be odd, after all, for UK academics to devote more attention to the development of, say, Plymouth, Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland or Dundee than to its major metropolitan areas. As Parr notes, the presumed advantages of PURs need to be qualified when applied to smaller urban areas:
'…its distinctive spatial structure may in certain instances represent an overall liability. Problems such as dispersed urban population, small-scale infrastructure facilities, the lack of high-order business services and the division of effort among competing centres may all combine to form an unfavourable investment environment ' (2004: 236 
Cultural inertia in polycentric urban regions
Cultural inertia is defined here as the process by which individuals and organisations absorb, adopt, adapt and reinforce taken-for-granted assumptions about an area's potentiality. The term cultural inertia is rarely used in the context of spatial studies (see Castanega, 2006; van Houston and Lagendijk, 2001 ) and even in the field of organisational studies, where the term is employed more frequently, the idea remains relatively underdeveloped (for a recent analysis, see Carrillo and Gromb, 2007 The related idea of 'lock-ins' helps to inform the development of an understanding of cultural inertia in a more immediate way. Grabher (1993) recognised that the future success of regions (which had developed strong industrial clusters and integrated infrastructures to support them in the past, but had experienced significant industrial restructuring) could be inhibited by vested interests. '…their industrial atmosphere, highly developed and specialized infrastructure, the close interfirm linkages, and strong political support by regional institutions -turned into stubborn obstacles to innovation. ' (1993: 256) . Grabher identified three inter-related elements of lock-in: functional lock-in (co-dependent relationships between businesses); cognitive lock-in (accepted discourses surrounding economic cycles); and, political lock-in (the maintenance of allegiance and commitment to existing industrial clusters). The argument, essentially, is that these factors collectively limit the scope for economic and political investment in new areas of development and innovation because key stakeholders are unable to 'unlearn' old tricks (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999 ). This in turn, can lead to political conservatism, as Hassink and Shin (2005) , in reviewing the literature on lock-ins, observe: As is suggested in this article's title, by 'smoke and mirrors' I allude to two interrelated issues. First, that complete clarity of vision and understanding about the characteristics and potentiality of a particular area is impossible to achieve because interpretations are obfuscated by deeply embedded cultural conditions. Myths which are internalised locally and the rituals which reinforce them, for example, help to make sense of a place, but are not necessarily grounded in empirical reality. The second, is that actors make sense of place by making more or less positive comparisons with other areas. It is useful to draw a parallel between the way that 'individuals' and 'places' may position themselves in identity terms in the wider social world. Interactionist sociology, which draws upon Charles Cooley's development of the Jamesian notion of the 'looking glass self' (Coser 1977: 355) informs us that people achieve a sense of selfhood by positioning themselves in relation to significant others. Studying places is more complex because they are composites of thousands of individual actors with diverse backgrounds, values, capabilities and interests. That said, people in places do seem to construct a sense of local self identity (Parker, 2000; Massey, 1995; van der Graaf, 2009 ). The fact that some places assume social superiority over others derives from the process of comparison. A sense of social superiority, once established, tends to reproduce itself; providing that enough evidence, prejudicial or otherwise, can be garnered (or ignored) to demonstrate that the assumption is true.
A sense of comparable inferiority also requires explanation. Few places would wish to account for a perceived failure to thrive as their own fault and as a consequence draw on other explanations to account for their situation. An alternative approach is to blame something or somebody else, as anthropologist Katherine Newman (1988) has shown in her study of downward social mobility. Newman uses the concept of 'categorical fate' to show how redundant senior executives accounted for their plight by externalising responsibility. Many claimed that their 'best attributes' had not been appreciated and believed that they had been fired because their value system was 'too ethical' or their ideas 'too good' for the corporation to recognise. By stating that a mistake had been made by someone else, the awkward problem of realising their own potential by harnessing their other positive attributes became conveniently hidden from view.
It is possible that places, like people, also construct arguments to account for failure by incorporating elements of categorical fate. This is not to argue, of course, that externally driven problems are not hugely important, such as the closure of a major industry, as has recently been the case in Tees Valley. Such events do have a massive impact on the local economy -it is not just an attitude of mind. But in terms of planning for recovery, arguments that rely on aspects of categorical fate could result in key stakeholders (and people in general) relying on arguments that limit the scope for positive action. As indicated in Grabher's concept of lock-in, stakeholders may continue to promulgate ideas about the kinds of economic activity that the area should be involved in, to the detriment of other potentialities that could be realised.
Analysing cultural inertia, in summary, involves the process of making sense of the stories that places tell about themselves and the assessment of how these accounts impact on the way that opportunities are identified, are rejected, are ignored or go unseen. By defining cultural inertia in this way, it is not assumed necessarily to be a negative phenomenon. Indeed, it can be argued that the economic, cultural and social vibrancy of the most successful cities is sustained precisely because people who live there (or migrate to that area) expect the best outcomes for themselves; and as a consequence, they adopt practices to ensure that they perpetuate it. Neither is it assumed that any area could be entirely positive or entirely negative about its potentiality. Local circumstances are never that clear cut, as Hassink and Shin argue, 'The line… between successful and open regions and old industrialised, insular, inward-looking areas can be very thin ' (2005: 573) . Instead, the term is adopted to capture a sense of the social, political and cultural 'mood' and to assess its impact on how places plan for the future.
Polycentricity in Tees Valley
When an area suffers economic decline, the area has to tell itself a story about why that situation came about and to accommodate in cultural terms to its prospects for the future. This process may be more complex in PURs because they lack a distinct urban core. It is useful now to define different (Chapman et al., 2007) .
CHALLENGES FACED BY TEES VALLEY
My interest in the idea of cultural inertia emerged when it became clear from in-depth interviews and focus groups that key decision makers in the area were often aware of positive actions that needed to be taken to serve the interests of the area as a whole, but that something held them back from pushing such ideas forward. Often, the area settled for less imaginative compromises which could result in the reintroduction of previous or repackaging of existing initiatives, or favoured inaction because of an expectation that local factors would scupper radical action.
The principal factor which dampened ambition was the polycentric urban characteristics of Tees Valley which militates against effective sub-region wide cooperation.
Participants in focus groups also agreed that change was difficult to achieve, but this did not deter them from debating what needed, in an 'ideal world', to be done. Identifying what needed to be done in an ideal world is one thing, but asking stakeholders to identify mechanisms to achieve positive change is another. Indeed, evidence from in-depth interviews had produced 'so many' issues which had to be tackled that effecting change appeared to be an insurmountable problem. Consequently, policy interventions operated on the principle of 'keeping the ship afloat' rather than attempting radical change. One respondent described this as a 'sticking plaster mind set', where public, private and third sector organisations unwittingly contributed to the reproduction of a cycle of underachievement relative to other areas, so depressing aspirations for the future.
In another' (Robinson, et al., 1999: 162) .
Having established that competition over resources was endemic across Tees Valley, focus groups discussed the prospects for a closer confederation between the five unitary authorities in a newly proposed city region. 7 While the majority claimed personally to favour the idea, in principle, most doubted whether there was sufficient political will at local level to make it work. Responsibility was deflected to elected Members, whose parochialism was presumed to result in a very strong focus on borough level needs (or in the case of some boroughs, different towns within the authority). Townsend (2005) demonstrates that professionals and senior managers are the most likely to commute between boroughs or beyond the sub-region, but also shows that there is very significant commuting amongst lower-skilled occupational groups. In spite of extensive commuting, local authorities tended to plan at borough level and often failed to recognise the incongruity between patterns of labour market activity of the resident population compared with the local labour market itself. This may be one of the most limiting aspects of policy development in the area -especially so given that serious skill shortages in the east of the region are not being met by integrated sub-regional planning. The assumption that Tees Valley's future is shaped largely by external forces was particularly pronounced when focus groups discussed the impact of globalisation. While most bemoaned loss or diminution of employment in 'home-grown' heavy industries from the 1970s, it was also recognised that the area continued to remain heavily dependent on the global market (particularly in chemicals and steel making). However, apart from officers with an economic development brief in the boroughs within which the industries were located, levels of understanding about these markets was very limited. For example, few recognised that much of the output from the steel and process industries were dependent upon the buoyancy, at that time, of economic activity in India, China and South East Asia. Consequently, these economies were wrongly considered mainly as a direct threat to the local economy. As will be explained in the conclusion, subsequent economic change, will again reshape attitudes about the impact of globalisation on Tees Valley.
What kind of place is Tees Valley?
Liveability, in policy circles, is a commonly adopted term to measure the quality of life in an area. As the State of the Cities Report stated:
'The liveability agenda is essentially about creating places where people choose to live and work. In this sense liveability can be understood as a key competitive element between cities in terms of attracting both people and businesses to a city.' (Parkinson et al., 2006: 156) .
In this study, no attempt was made to constrain the fluidity in the usage of Cleveland Bridge, see also Beynon, et al. 1994; Hudson, 1989) Valley was unknown, in-migrants were viewed as a problem (taking jobs from local people), and reflecting an existing problem (that local people, especially from workless households, will not work). The focus on migrant workers, rightly, drew attention to the take up of relatively low-paid work, and indeed, there was a recognition that many employers were recruiting through agencies to increase employee flexibility and possibly suppress pay levels. The consequence of this was that local people were unable to take jobs offered on flexible contracts because of restrictions imposed by state benefit system. Concern about migration were explicable, therefore, but stakeholders' comments reveal questions about the 'legitimacy' of inmigration per se when a more positive focus could be to emphasis the potential of migrants to increase skill levels and entrepreneurship (Pillai, 2006) .
The idea of negative cultural inertia encapsulates, in summary, an 'insurmountable problems' mind set which encourages stakeholders to adopt a 'sticking plaster' approach to policy interventions. This tendency is strengthened by polycentricity which increases parochialism and waters down the impact of investment in the area. Cultural inertia appears, The purpose of developing the concept of cultural inertia is to help analysts make sense, in sociological terms, of an area's response to social and economic upheavals; and, to help understand why an area makes the choices it does, rightly or wrongly, to achieve a positive future. The concept of cultural inertia cannot, of course, explain everything we need to know about how places position themselves in relation to others in social, political and economic terms and subsequently plan for the future. Instead, the concept of cultural inertia should be considered as a useful additional analytical tool to compliment other theories which attempt to explain the origins of local conditions and the consequences of these conditions. It has been shown that path dependency theory, for example, provides much scope to account, in historical context, for the patterned web of social, spatial and economic interactions which contribute to an area's current situation. Similarly, Grabher's related concept of 'lock-in' helps to explain the consequences of anachronistic commitment to particular industrial sectoral foundation stones which may limit the prospects for successful economic transformation. What both of these accounts seem to lack, however, is a dynamic explanation of the social processes which underpin decision makers' tendency to link ideas surrounding economy, place and people when constructing ideas on how to effect change. Recognise that local allegiance to a sense of place as a strength, but, invest for the benefit of the area as a whole.
There is a tendency to water down the quality of developments because all the boroughs attempt to deliver the full range of amenity.
Strengthen commitment to the development of flagship developments which serve the whole area and raise local and sub-regional sense of pride in place.
Externalities Assumption that the dominant Tyneside city region is unfairly advantaged in social, cultural political and economic terms and that it acts as a drain on regional resource.
Accept that polycentric urban form militates against the development of a core metropolitan urban environment and build on individual strengths of localities and small town culture.
Dependence upon and mistrust of large transnational employers' motivations and assumption that global markets make the area unduly vulnerable.
Recognise that the global economy is likely to benefit the area and develop links so that the whole sub-region serves and benefits from such development.
Liveability
Area cannot attract or retain people because the social, leisure, housing and cultural environment is not good enough.
Small town culture is a positive asset which should be recognised and built upon in order to attract people who value such assets.
Industrial restructuring, fractured urban spatial configuration, poor environmental reputation, poor transport and social deprivation has a negative reputational impact.
Cross-boundary strategy through City Region planning could more effectively employ resources and challenge this tendency.
Migration
Out-migration of higher skilled/ graduate workers undermines economic performance. Assumption that in-migrants undermine the local labour market.
Recognise that graduate in-migration is primarily led by the quality of the job offer rather than liveability. Seek to constrain employer exploitation of low-wage migrants at the expense of the local labour market.
Intra sub-regional housing migration undermines community cohesion and deepens pockets of deprivation.
Continue to tackle housing market failure in innovative ways, but recognise that inter-borough housing migration is neither controllable nor necessarily detrimental. 6 Historical association with place has strong resonance in the area.
Hartlepool has rich monastic associations with the development of early Middlesbrough is a 19 th century new town, so described by Gladstone as 'infant Hercules' (Briggs, 1968 Robinson, et al. (1999) . Centre Plus (amongst others) was identified as a particular threat to the sub-region's ability to control its own destiny.
14 A commonly rehearsed (and probably erroneous) story to reflect this is the failure of Middlesbrough to gain city status on the grounds that a Whitehall mandarin assumed that both Middlesbrough and Sunderland were situated on the River Wear and that it was not appropriate to have two cities in such close proximity. 15 It is increasingly being asserted in Tees Valley that a greater focus on the development of the Tees will have positive benefits for the area. Much work has already been done in this respect with the development of the Tees Barrage, the complete redevelopment of the riverside at Stockton and Thornaby and the prospects of further development on the north shore of the Tees. Middlehaven is also vaunted as a major strategic development of an integrated leisure, shopping, education and residential environment. These are all welcome and important initiatives, but sometimes lead to the assertion that once they are complete, the cultural and economic environment along the riverside could 'be like' other cities which have successful riverside urban centres (most particularly Newcastle/Gateshead).
16 In areas proximate to industrial concentrations, the local population were presumed to be culturally acclimatised to environmental and health risks associated particularly with process industries, and recognised their dependence upon them economically. People who lived and worked further afield perceived the industrial heart of the region as an alien place and sought to distance themselves from it.
17 For a critical discussion of the reasons for housing mobility in the area, see Chapman (1999) . Valley was identified as beneficial to the area.
